The relationship between child theory of mind and social skills, which causes and which causes?
2022-06-11 0 By
On the one hand, children with other developmental disorders, such as specific language impairment, Down syndrome, or Williams syndrome, were significantly less able to make psychological attributions than normal children with age-matched intelligence, despite lower intelligence in the latter two groups.Similarly, children with hyperactive impulsiveness (ADHD) with significant executive function and attention problems apparently have intact theory of mind competence, and perhaps those with the most severe attention deficits have problems with theory of mind competence (Bu-Itelaar et al., 1999).Thus, theory of mind deficits in autistic children are not purely a matter of attention or general intelligence.Various evidences indicate that the psychological attribution and empathic abilities of children with autism disorder are specifically deficient compared with other mental abilities.Jellans and others suggest that the symptoms of autism that cannot be satisfactorily explained by cognitive deficits may play a role in the developmental disorder that leads to cognitive deficits.But in schizophrenia, the combination of symptoms must be explained in some other way.Because the cognitive deficits found in schizophrenia cannot be the result of factors such as malfunctioning of some comparison component.Psychological deficits also cannot account for all symptoms that cannot be explained by the self-monitoring failure hypothesis.Jellans et al. suggest that the best explanation for the symptoms of schizophrenia is neurobiological rather than cognitive.Strictly speaking, this still doesn’t clarify whether the normal ability to read people’s minds is some sort of structurally real ability.But the point is, even if psychological knowledge is based on some kind of cognitive module, we still don’t have some kind of integrated cognitive explanation for schizophrenia.What is the cause and effect of theory of mind and social skills?Many studies have used the method of correlation analysis to explore the relationship between psychological knowledge and social skills.But as Blair noted, the existence of correlations tells us little about functional structure.A similar argument is that correlation is one thing and causation is another.Moreover, even if a correlation between two measures of cognitive ability X and Y is the result of some kind of causal relationship, there are still questions about the nature of the relationship.The direction of causality may be from X to Y, from Y to X, or both X and Y may depend on the third factor, Z.And even when this direction of causality has been resolved, there are problems in drawing conclusions about functional structure.For example, if there is a causal effect from X to Y, it still does not reveal whether the cognitive system that forms the underlying basis of X is a component of the system that forms the basis of Y.For example, having ability X may be critical to acquiring ability Y, but ability X may not be directly involved in the practice of ability Y.That is, X may be a distal cause of Y, not a neighboring cause.Similarly, if both X and Y depend on a third factor, this factor may be critical to the acquisition of X and Y, but is not directly involved in the practice of either.But when there is a correlation between some aspect of psychological knowledge and social skills, it is natural to ask whether there is a causal link between the two, and if so, in what direction.Some researchers have emphasized that both language and social experience play a role in the development of psychological knowledge.If this is true, the development of some social skills probably precedes the development of some aspects of psychological knowledge.On the other hand, some types of social interaction clearly require psychological knowledge.It seems indisputable that much of dealing with social life is dealing with a world in which people have beliefs, desires and emotions different from our own;And coping successfully with such a world sometimes requires an understanding of these psychological phenomena.If this is true, the development of certain aspects of psychological knowledge should precede the development of certain social skills.If, during the course of normal development of cognitive ability depends on another cognitive X, Y, we could further to ask the next question: is the development of the X as a remote cause of Y development (e.g., Y can be a contribution to effective learning conditions), or as a neighboring cause (directly affect the practice of Y in the specific time)?An example of an intuitive and clear explanation of this problem is Talla’s explanation of SLI.There is evidence that knowledge of inflectional morphology depends on specific aspects of hearing (related to the perception of sound changes at very short intervals).It seems clear that these features of hearing play a distal role in promoting the development of certain zigzag morphological knowledge by influencing the learning conditions of zigzag morphological rules.These key features of hearing do not directly affect whether lexical knowledge is present or used at a given time.Suppose, for example, that a subject has acquired this lexical knowledge, is able to use it, and then suffers from this particular type of hearing impairment.Intuitively, there was no reason to expect that the subject’s performance on the lexical task would be directly impaired.Nor can it be assumed that a subject has a defect in lexical understanding because of a certain auditory defect.The lexical defect is caused distal by, but not caused by, the auditory defect.If the subject’s hearing improved immediately, intuitively there was no reason to predict that the subject would immediately perform at normal levels on the lexical task.In considering this SLI example, the context of consideration is to discuss the role of social interaction and interpersonal activity in the etiology of psychological cognition.But we can think of psychological knowledge as either a cause or an effect.Therefore, some aspect of psychological knowledge is considered, such as false belief knowledge, certain social skills, etc.We might ask whether the development of false belief knowledge is a distal cause of the development of social skills, just as key auditory features are a distal cause of the development of lexical knowledge and certain types of social interaction are a distal cause of the development of psychological knowledge.Or, is false belief knowledge some kind of proximate cause that directly affects the existence of these social skills at a particular time?Is false belief recognition practiced in real time in this day-to-day manifestation of social skills?Such problems also arise in the case of psychological knowledge and pragmatic features of language use.There is a lot of evidence to suggest that the impairment of mental knowledge and the impairment of pragmatic features in the use of language in autistic people appear together, for example, there is a relationship between mental knowledge and the ability to maintain a particular topic.People with autism also show poor comprehension of metaphors and sarcasm (Happe) and difficulty in distinguishing between jokers’ and liars’ speech intentions (Leekam & Amp;.Prior, 1994).But evidence of a link, correlation, or even a causal relationship between poor mental knowledge and poor language use in autism does not add much to our understanding of the role that mental knowledge plays in the real-time processing of language use.Evidence of cognitive impairment as a result of brain injury or some subsequent disorder such as schizophrenia after mental knowledge maturates provides considerable support for the idea that the training of everyday communication skills involves the real-time adoption of mental knowledge.Therefore, research findings such as the loss of interpretive ability of others and the loss of pragmatic features undoubtedly support the above propositions.Langton et al. also found false-belief deficits in schizophrenia that could not be explained by more general problems in patients’ performance in a picture-sequencing task.The patients also had difficulty recognizing sarcasm and metaphor, although there was no significant difference between control subjects and normal expression intention (Langdon, Davies, & AMP;Coltheart, 2002).Their problems in irony and metaphor do not reflect a single pragmatic deficit.Because the findings suggest that interpreting sarcasm and metaphor involve different cognitive processes.The interpretation of sarcasm involves relatively skilled psychological knowledge, which is deficient in schizophrenia;Metaphorical interpretation requires only some more basic mental state attribution capacity, which is intact in schizophrenia.The difficulty in metaphorical interpretation of schizophrenics is caused by reasons other than psychological cognitive deficits.If we are to understand more about the contribution of psychological knowledge to social skills, it is clear that more comparative studies of similarities in psychological knowledge, as well as individual differences in psychological knowledge, are needed in several populations.These groups include typically developing children, autistic children, deaf and blind children, as well as normal adults, people with brain damage, and people with schizophrenia.Why is the development of psychological knowledge so important for children?As mentioned earlier, psychological knowledge is essential to children’s social life and provides them with a flexible interpretative framework for many aspects of human social activity.The development of psychological cognition is of great significance to children’s moral development, social development and communication skill development.